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This study assesses the extent to which changes in bank capital exacerbate the
cyclical behaviour of credit in the bank lending channel (BLC) of monetary
policy. The BLC presumes that expansionary monetary policy directly affects
bank loan supply, hence stimulating economic growth through greater investment.
However, the current financial crisis has highlighted several weaknesses in the
banking sector that could prevent the BLC from functioning properly. I focus on
the role of bank capital in Europe.
The key question is whether higher bank capital, instead of triggering greater
bank lending, dampens loan growth. The financial crisis and its aftermath have
shown that changes in bank capital may have pro-cyclical effects amplified by
the Basel II risk-sensitive capital rules (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
consultative document 2009). More specifically, bank capital requirements are
likely to rise with increasing risk in economic downturns, at a time when capital
is more difficult to raise, which may result in credit contraction and hence a
deepening of recessions. If so, higher capital would not dampen losses during
economic stagnation periods and rather would amplify the credit restrictions risk,
thus contributing to worsening output fluctuations. This potential scenario is of
vital concern for scholars and policymakers as it can seriously hamper prospects
of faster economic recovery in Europe.
Bank capital and bank lending are endogenous to each other as they are both
affected by the financial and economic shocks that are in the error term. Interestingly,
this endogeneity has never been explored. Is it a simultaneity problem or omitted
relevant variables bias?
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The simultaneous equations model is appropriate in case of a simultaneity bias
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with i=1,…, 41 , m=1,…, 13 , t=1,…, 10 where i is the number of banks, m is the
number of countries and t is the year. In the equation, Δ ln(loans)it is the change in the
natural logarithm of aggregate loans, capitalit is the total regulatory capital ratio, Δimt,
is the change in the monetary policy rate, and regit is regulatory pressure.
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator with bank capital as an endogenous
regressor for bank lending is appropriate in the presence of omitted variables bias. The
instruments for bank capital are: regit, a regulatory pressure variable, riskit, a proxy for
bank risks and depit, the deposit ratio. The first-stage regression is:
capitalit ¼ δ0i þ δ1regit þ δ2depit þ δ3riskit þ δ4Δimt−1 þ δ5Δln gdpð Þmt−1
þ δ6crisist þ δ7sizeit þ δ8liquidityit−1 þ η1it ð2Þ
Using the fitted values of capital from Eq. (2) we can estimate the second-stage
regression:
Δln loansð Þit ¼ φ0i þ φ1 dcapitalit þ φ2Δimt−1 þ φ3Δln gdpð Þmt−1 þ φ4crisist
þ φ5sizeit þ φ6liquidityit−1 þ η2it ð3Þ
where,Δln(gdp)mt − 1 is real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, crisist is a financial
crisis dummy, sizeit is bank size, and liquidityit–1 is bank liquidity. As a robustness
check, I also model the relationship between bank lending and bank capital using the
dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology.
The results for the simultaneous equations model in Eq. (1) suggest that the
relationship between bank capital and bank lending is unidirectional: only bank capital
has a causal effect on bank lending. Bank capital is statistically significant at the 1 %
significance level in the loan growth equation. However, in the capital equation, loan
growth is not statistically significant and the size of the coefficient is also tiny.
The results from the 2SLS model in Eq. (3) constitute the second main finding:
banks reduce loan supply in the aftermath of an increase in capital, after controlling for
GDP growth as a proxy for loan demand and other bank characteristics. The results are
robust to alternative GMM estimations.
The present findings are in contrast to economic theory and suggest that the
traditional cycle between greater bank capitalisation and greater lending is impaired.
A compelling explanation of the results is that the capital ratio is increased by reducing
the risk-weighted assets (RWAs), rather than by injecting new capital into the banks’
balance sheet (capital= total capital / RWAs). Since loans constitute an important part
of the RWAs, banks could be increasing the capital ratio by reducing the quantity of
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loans. This feedback cycle becomes more likely when raising new capital is very costly,
as in the financial crisis period.
In conclusion, from a policy perspective, the empirical examination feeds into the
current debate on new guidelines for capital and banking regulations drawn up by Basel
III (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision press release, 12 September 2010). In
particular, the results concur with the proposed creation of a counter-cyclical capital
buffer.
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